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Abstract
We study the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions on present-day so-
cioeconomic outcomes for Latin America. Our thesis is that more
advanced pre-colonial institutions relate to better socioeconomic out-
comes today. We advance that pre-colonial institutions survived to
our days thanks to the existence of largely self-governed Amerindian
communities in rural Latin America. Amerindians groups with more
advanced institutional capacity would have been able to organize and
defend their interests in front of national governments; leading to bet-
ter development outcomes for themselves and for the population at
large. We test our thesis with a dataset of 324 sub-national admin-
istrative units covering all mainland Latin American countries. Our
extensive range of controls covers factors such as climate, location,
natural resources, colonial activities and pre-colonial characteristics -
plus country xed e¤ects. Results strongly support our thesis.
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1 Introduction
While much research e¤ort has been directed over the last two decades to the
role of institutions in long-run economic development, most of the literature
has followed the lead of Acemoglu et al. (2001) in focusing on the insti-
tutional structures implanted throughout the world by European nations
during the colonial period. While this approach has certainly advanced our
understanding of the process of long-run development, recent research has
also uncovered a substantial role for pre-colonial institutional factors - in
particular for the African case (Gennaioli and Rainer 2007, Michalopoulos
and Papaioannu 2013, 2014). This paper aims to take the literature forward
by analyzing the role of pre-colonial institutions on present-day socioeco-
nomic outcomes for Latin America. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the rst attempt of this kind for the Latin American case.
Our study employs as its unit of analysis the largest administrative di-
visions of each Latin American country below the national level, which we
refer to as sub-national states.1 We collect socioeconomic and geographic
data for 324 sub-national states from all 17 countries in mainland Latin
America - including data on the ethnic composition of the population within
each state. This ethnic structure of the population is used to construct, for
each state, an index of pre-colonial institutional advancement - by linking
each ethnic group to its level of political complexity as reported in George
Peter Murdocks Ethnographic Atlas (1967). The resulting measure of pre-
colonial institutions is then used as a predictor of present-day measures of
socioeconomic development such as education, health, or income per per-
son. Through a large battery of robustness tests, we show that our prior of
a positive relationship between pre-colonial institutions and present-day so-
cioeconomic development holds while controlling for a number of alternative
determinants of economic success.
Our paper relates to several strands of the literature on economic de-
1The actual name given to these administrative divisions changes from country to
country: provincias in Argentina, departamentos in Bolivia, regiones in Chile, estados in
Mexico, and so on.
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velopment over the very long-run. A number of papers have uncovered
how historical phenomena have persistent e¤ects on economic development,
in particular for Africa. Nunn (2008) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011)
relate the intensity of the African slave trade, most of which takes place
over the pre-colonial period, to current levels of income per capita and in-
terpersonal trust. Huillery (2011) argues that the attitudes of pre-colonial
African states towards Europeans have an inuence on current develop-
ment outcomes as colonizers invested more in the areas where Africans were
less hostile. Closest to our paper are the works of Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannu (2013, 2014), who also measure
pre-colonial institutions using the degree of political complexity of di¤erent
ethnic groups from Murdock (1967). We di¤er from these last three works
by using sub-national states as the unit of analysis, an approach which has
been increasingly employed in the wider literature on growth and develop-
ment (Acemoglu and Dell 2010, Gennaioli et al. 2014).2
Our paper also relates to a number of recent works focusing on the
determinants of long-run development in Latin America. Bruhn and Gal-
lego (2012) study the e¤ects of di¤erent colonial activities, such as mining
or plantation agriculture, using sub-national states as the unit of analysis.
This o¤ers a relevant set of controls for our own study, as we seek to fac-
tor out colonial inuences from pre-colonial ones. Controlling for colonial
activities appears particularly relevant in the light of another recent study,
by Arias and Girod (2014), presenting evidence that colonial policies were
to a large extent determined by pre-colonial factors - in particular the exis-
tence or absence of forced labour. Also of relevance, Maloney and Valencia
(forthcoming) study the persistence of economic success from pre-colonial
times to the present across the Americas - a theme that was rst investi-
gated by Acemoglu et al. (2002) in their "reversal of fortune" thesis. We
2Gennaioli and Rainer (2007) use nations as their unit of analysis, which would result in
too few observations in Latin America and does not allow for the inclusion of country xed
e¤ects. Michalopoulos and Papaioannu (2013) use ethnic groups as their unit of analysis,
which is feasible for Latin America but comes with its own special set of challenges (see
Elizalde 2016 for an analysis using this alternative approach).
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add evidence to this side of the literature by controlling for the initial level
of development in some of our regressions. Finally, it is important to men-
tion that a number of papers have studied the long-run e¤ects of specic
historical episodes in Latin America, such as the mita labour system of Peru
and Bolivia (Dell 2010), the exploitation of sugarcane and gold in di¤erent
areas of Brazil (Naritomi et al. 2012), or the early establishment of political
inequality in 19th century Colombia (Acemoglu et al. 2008).3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 o¤ers an histor-
ical overview, formulates our main hypothesis and presents historical evi-
dence in its favour. Section 3 discusses the data and presents our empirical
methodology. Sections 4 and 5 present our empirical analysis, extensions
and robustness checks. Section 6, nally, o¤ers some concluding remarks.
2 Historical overview and main hypothesis
The paucity of research on the role of pre-colonial institutions in socioeco-
nomic development for the Latin American case may be explained by the
overpowering importance of the colonial experience in this region. Indeed,
colonialism was not only much longer lasting than in other regions of the
world, about three centuries for most Latin American nations, but it was also
accompanied by a massive transformation of the ethnic structure of the pop-
ulation. Su¤ering the consequences of a new disease environment, the abo-
riginal population of the Americas (henceforth Amerindians) was decimated
over the hundred years following rst contact with Europeans. In its place,
a society of "whites" (European descendants), mestizos (people with mixed
Amerindian and European ancestry), Amerindians and Africans, these last
ones brought to the continent as slave labour, took over. Amerindians have
always occupied the lower ranks of the new social hierarchy established with
the colonial conquest, while European descendants, and later on mestizos,
have dominated political and economic a¤airs ever since.
3For a more comprehensive review of the literature on how historical factors determine
long-run development see Nunn (2014).
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While correct, these central features of Latin American history should
not lead us to conclude that pre-colonial culture was simply wiped out fol-
lowing the European arrival and had no chance of inuencing the present.
Western culture may well be the dominant element in present-day Latin
America, as best exemplied by the almost universal adoption of the Chris-
tian religion and the languages from Portugal and Spain, but in numerous
cases this dominance contains important elements of Amerindian culture.
Pre-colonial rites, such as o¤erings to the Mother-Earth, are still common
among large sections of the Latin American population - and do not stop
those who perform them from attending the Sunday Mass. And pre-colonial
languages such as quechua or nahuatl (the lingua francas of the former Inca
and Aztec empires) can be easily heard in the food markets of cities and
towns across the Andes and central Mexico. Elements of pre-colonial cul-
ture have survived ve centuries of colonial and post-colonial regimes, and
the present section discusses how this took place and why it could matter
for the analysis of current socioeconomic outcomes.
While Amerindians remained at the fringes of the economic and political
power ever since the European conquest, they played a crucial role as the
main source of labour, and therefore principal factor of production, in two of
the most important sectors of the colonial economy: mining and agricultural
production for the local market.4 Amerindian labour was the main source
of wealth for Spanish settlers in the Americas, as best summarized by the
aphorism "Sin Indios no hay Indias" ("Without Indians there is no Indies")
- attributed to 16th century Spanish settlers when defending the granting
of rights over Indian labour against accusations by the Crown of excessive
exploitation.
The extraction of this Amerindian labour relied on the use of aboriginal
structures of power and organization. While the growing class of mestizos
lived in towns and cities and collaborated closely with the European elite,
4Agricultural production for the export market, focused on crops such as sugarcane,
tobacco and cotton, employed African slave labour. See Angeles (2013) for an analysis of
the factors determining the ow of slaves to the Americas.
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Amerindians by and large retired to their rural communities where they lived
a separate cultural life from the rest of society. Spanish governors referred to
this network of Indian villages, where no Europeans lived permanently and
where Amerindians were free to organize internal a¤airs according to their
traditional law, as the "Republic of Indians". This Republic should not
be understood as an independent political entity with well-dened frontiers
and a recognized legal status within the colonial society. Instead, it was a
name used to group all areas of Amerindian self-rule, and followed from the
colonial policy of keeping Amerindians separated from the European elite
yet accessible as a source of labour.
WIthin the Republic of Indians, villages were compelled to pay taxes and
supply tribute in the form of labour, but colonial authorities were otherwise
uninterested in dictating the day to day life of Amerindians. A number of
schemes such as the encomienda, repartimiento or mita were put in place
to recruit, transport and monitor labour tribute, but the administration
of these systems typically relied on local leaders or headmen, who enjoyed
privileges such as the private ownership of land and exception from taxation.
In this way, as James Lang put it, "The Spanish enterprise in the New World
rested on an indigenous social order" (Lang 1975, p. 7).
This separate existence of Amerindians and their freedom to organize
their internal a¤airs was put in place to facilitate the colonizers access
to Amerindian labour, but had the unintended consequence of preserving
many features of pre-colonial culture and pre-colonial institutions over the
long run. The existence of a "Republic of Indians", inadvertently, kept alive
the notion of large pre-colonial nations in the places where these existed.
Amerindian groups which had once developed advanced political organiza-
tions were able to maintain some of that institutional capacity throughout
the colonial period.
It is the central thesis of this paper that such institutional capacity was
nally put to use with the advent of independence, and in particular during
the 20th century, and resulted in a positive association between present-
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day socioeconomic outcomes and pre-colonial institutional development. An
important aspect of this thesis is that the institutional capacity of pre-
colonial groups was far from uniform across the Americas. At the time of
rst contact with Europeans, Amerindian institutional complexity varied
from the multi-layered bureaucracy administering the vast Inca Empire to
the numerous small chiefdoms with no political organization beyond the
village level. Figure 1 presents the situation by plotting our measure of pre-
colonial institutions (to be described in detail in the next section) across
all sub-national states in Latin America. The contours of the Inca and
Aztec empire are in evidence, as are the relatively advanced areas of the
Yucatan peninsula and central Colombia (where groups such as the Maya
and the Muisca were organized at the level of confederacies of city-states).
The variation observed in gure 1 implies that the e¤ect of pre-colonial
institutions on socioeconomic development would be sizeable in some regions
and negligible in others.
[Figure 1]
Which, however, would be the specic mechanisms explaining a link from
more advanced pre-colonial institutions, preserved in Latin Americas rural
communities, and socioeconomic development as measured today? While
several mechanisms may be at play, we believe the historical evidence clearly
supports the existence and importance of one in particular: institutionally-
advanced Amerindian groups were able to organize themselves and defend
their interests in front of colonial and post-colonial governments. This
would have resulted in more favorable policies towards regions inhabited
by Amerindians with advanced institutional capacities, in particular in the
areas of education, health, and public infrastructure, and better access to
natural resources, in particular agricultural land. Indeed, it is on this last
point, the ownership and redistribution of agricultural land, where we be-
lieve the evidence for this general mechanism is most clearly in evidence -
as we document in what follows.
The ownership of land has always been a hotly contested issue in Latin
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America and a topic of utmost importance for Amerindians, for whom agri-
culture is typically the main economic activity. Already during colonial
times it is possible to observe that members of the most institutionally-
advanced pre-colonial groups were sometimes able to use the judicial system
to challenge the dominant classes for the ownership of land. Of far more
relevance, however, is the achievement of land reforms across many countries
in Latin America throughout the 20th century. A land reform is one of the
largest political and economic transformations that a government can try
to put in place - its hallmark feature being the redistribution of land from
large and rich landowners to people with little or no land. Land reforms
do not take place without the concerted and sustained organization of the
groups who stand to benet from it, in this case Amerindians.
If the mechanism we put forward is correct, a look at gure 1 would
be enough to predict the existence and scope of land reforms across Latin
America. The most far reaching land reforms would be expected to take
place in the countries occupying the core of the former Aztec and Inca em-
pires - Mexico, Peru and Bolivia.5 These may be followed by countries in
the peripheries of such empires, such as Ecuador and Chile, and countries
where other advanced pre-colonial groups existed, such as Guatemala and
Colombia. Finally, countries like Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay,
where pre-colonial groups were not organized beyond the village level, would
have seen the least activity in terms of land reform. As it turns out, the pat-
tern just hypothesized matches the historical record on land reforms almost
perfectly.
The two most far-reaching land reforms of the continent took place in
Mexico and Bolivia, in both cases following periods of armed conict in
which Amerindians played a leading role (the Mexican revolution of 1910
and the Bolivian revolution of 1952). About four-fths of agricultural land
was redistributed in Bolivia, and as much as half in the case of Mexico (Kay
5The capital of the Inca empire was Cuzco, located in the highlands of Peru, but as
gure 1 shows a higher share of present-day Bolivia is inhabited by descendants from the
Inca empire as compared to present-day Peru.
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1998, p. 17). These two reforms, the rst ones to take place in the con-
tinent, served as an inspiration for similar, but less successful ones, which
spread across Latin America over the decades of the 1960s and 1970s.6 For
instance, while the proportion of peasants and rural workers beneting from
land redistribution was about three quarters in Bolivia and close to a half
in Mexico, it was a third in Peru, one fth in Chile, and around one tenth
in Ecuador and Colombia (Kay 1998, p. 17). Other reforms taking place in
Central America had varying levels of success but always below the Bolivian
and Mexican cases. Finally, it is also revealing to consider the countries
in which land reforms did not take place at all or at no signicant de-
gree. Argentina is the only case in Latin America where land reform and
land redistributions have been completely absent, while Brazil, Uruguay and
Paraguay have seen minor amounts of land redistribution but no attempts
at comprehensive land reform as in the rest of the continent (Kay 1998).
It is important to note at this point that we are silent about the ulti-
mate success of land reforms as a policy to induce development. Many land
reforms in Latin America were subsequently diluted or reversed, and the
formal empirical work that exists on the matter shows a negative associa-
tion between land redistribution and present-day development outcomes.7
What we do believe, however, is that the pattern and depth of land reforms
across the continent provides clear evidence of the di¤erent capacities of
Amerindian groups to make their interests heard; and that this capacity
seems, at rst sight, related to their pre-colonial levels of political organi-
zation. Thus, we regard the above as evidence of a broader pattern of suc-
cess in political demands, which would result in benecial policies towards
Amerindians in areas such as health, education and poverty reduction.
Finally, while the above mechanism o¤ers a clear linkage from pre-
colonial institutions to socioeconomic success of Amerindian groups, we must
emphasize that most of our empirical analysis will use as dependent vari-
6A third case of land reform which was also highly inuential was that of Cuba (1959).
The Cuban case is of course di¤erent, and Amerindians did not play any role in it.
7See, in particular, Dell (2012) for the case of Mexico.
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ables measures of socioeconomic success for the whole population of each
sub-national state, not for its Amerindian component. Of course, since
Amerindians are counted within the total population their success will be
reected at the aggregate level; but there are reasons to believe that more
than this simple composition e¤ect is at play. Indeed, poverty and ignorance
rarely benet anybody - including those who are not poor. Policies to im-
prove the human capital of Amerindians may benet the mestizo and white
population by supplying them with more able and better educated employees
and business partners. The rationale that sustains the delivery of free and
universal education and health services in most developed nations, namely
that the externalities of these activities benet the whole society, should also
apply to the provision of education and health to minority groups such as
Amerindians in Latin America.
The following sections describe how we set out to test the consequences
of the above hypothesis.8
3 Data and methodology
As our unit of analysis is the sub-national state, the rst step in our method-
ology involves the construction of a measure of pre-colonial institutional ad-
vancement at this level of disaggregation. We follow Gennaioli and Rainer
(2007) and Michalopoulos and Papaioannu (2013) in using the level of polit-
ical complexity of each ethnic group as reported in Murdocks Ethnographic
Atlas as our measure of institutions. Before continuing, a few comments are
in order regarding this data source and this particular variable.
8 It is important to note that other mechanisms linking pre-colonial institutions and so-
cioeconomic development may be at play. For example, ethnic groups with experience of
large-scale political organization may be able to organize the delivery of public services at
the local level, without the help of a national government, and may be better at integrating
within a complex market economy. For the case of Africa, Gennaioli and Rainer (2007)
emphasize that higher levels of political organization may increase the accountability of
local chiefs - for instance by rendering them accountable to courts or higher-level author-
ities within the ethnic group. We chose not to emphasize these alternative mechanisms
as evidence for their existence is lacking - unlike the case for the mechanism working via
political inuence at the national level.
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The Ethnographic Atlas summarizes a vast anthropological literature
into a single work by coding more than 60 variables for 1267 ethnic groups
from around the world.9 The variables cover a vast array of social and
economic aspects such as the way in which families are organized, how po-
litical leaders are elected, and the importance of economic activities such
as agriculture. While the Atlas has been an important source of informa-
tion in studies of long-run development for some time now, it is important
to note that most of its sources are anthropological works which involved
direct observation of the ethnic groups in question between the late 19th
century and the postwar period. Thus, while many African ethnic groups
would have been observed during the early phases of colonialism in Africa,
ethnic groups in the Americas were observed long after the establishment of
European colonial empires in or around their territories. In other words, it
is more di¢ cult to claim that the information in the Atlas reects the status
of pre-colonial institutions for ethnic groups in the Americas than for ethnic
groups in Africa.
While the above limitation of the data is certainly important, a number
of additional considerations suggest that its use will nevertheless be infor-
mative. First, while most sources of the Atlas are anthropological works,
Murdock also uses historical sources written at the time of rst contact with
Europeans whenever available. This is the case for the largest Amerindian
groups, such as the Aztecs or the Incas, for which well-documented descrip-
tions of their societies during the early 16th century exist. As an example,
variables relating to the people of the former Inca empire use Pedro Cieza
de Leons Cronicas del Peru (1554) as a source, written by one of the earliest
Spanish conquistadors in South America (Murdock 1981, p. 84). The use of
historical sources guarantees that variables relating to political complexity
adequately reect pre-colonial institutions, at least for the major groups.10
9The Ethnographic Atlas has been expanded and updated several times since its publi-
cation. The current version, used in this paper, is due to Gray (1999) and can be accessed
at http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Ethnographic_Atlas
10The ethnic groups in Latin America for which 16th century sources are used in-
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For smaller groups, we may worry that some of them lost political complex-
ity between the colonial conquest and the time when anthropologists visited
them. While this possibility cannot be discarded, it is unlikely to concern
an important number of groups since the vast majority of them were orga-
nized in small chiefdoms, tribes or bands to begin with - forms of political
organization which are at the bottom of the classication system used in
the Atlas anyway. Furthermore, and as described in the previous section,
colonial policy in Latin America typically provided large autonomy to eth-
nic groups in their internal a¤airs (the "Republic of Indians"), which would
have preserved pre-colonial institutions as long as they posed no threat to
colonial rulers.
In the Ethnographic Atlas, the degree of political complexity of each
group is measured by the variable "Jurisdictional Hierarchy beyond the lo-
cal community level". The variable takes discrete values between 0 and
4, where the value represents the number of levels of political organization
above the local community. Murdock assigns a value of 0 to groups orga-
nized in bands or single-village tribes, a value of 1 to chiefdoms comprising
a few villages or a single city-state, and a value of 2 for large chiefdoms with
many cities or confederacies of city-states. Values 3 and 4 are reserved for
states with several levels of intermediate bureaucracy between its ruler and
the local community (provinces, municipalities and so on). These categories
are somewhat related to the standard classication of political complexity
in anthropological studies, as rst formulated by Elman Service, which clas-
sies societies into bands, tribes, chiefdoms and states (Service 1971). As
discussed by Diamond (1997), the level of political complexity is closely re-
lated to technological advancement, which is needed in order to support an
ever larger class of non-food producers.
For the Americas, the only pre-colonial group that achieves the maximum
value of 4 in Murdocks classication is the Incas. Indeed, the Inca Empire is
clude: Chichimec, Tarascan, Aztec, Maya, Arawak, Carib, Chibcha (or Muisca), Inca,
and Coastal Tupi (Murdock 1967).
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well-recognized as the most sophisticated political and administrative struc-
ture developed in the Western Hemisphere before the European conquest
(Burkholder and Johnson 1998, p. 19).11 Perhaps surprisingly, the Aztec
Empire of central Mexico, the only pre-colonial state comparable to the
Inca Empire in terms of extension and population, is only assigned a value
of 2. This, arguably, is due to the Aztecs particular political organization,
which has been described as hegemonic or indirect. Kingdoms conquered
by the Aztecs remained independent in all internal a¤airs, their rulers were
typically not removed, and representatives of the Aztec Emperor, such as
provincial governors, were largely absent. We follow Murdocks choice and
use a value of 2 for the Aztec ethnic group through most of the paper; but we
also subject our results to robustness checks where either the Aztec group
is assigned the maximum value of 4 or the Inca group is assigned a lower
value of 2. Most other Amerindian groups are assigned a value of 0 or 1 in
Murdocks scale, with the exception of a few groups organized in confedera-
cies of city-states such as the Muisca of central Colombia or the Zapotecs of
southern Mexico.
We combine the above variable with data on the ethnic structure of
the population for each sub-national state in Latin America to construct
a population-weighted average of Murdocks Jurisdictional Hierarchy index
for all states. The variable is constructed using only the population and
institutional data for Amerindian ethnic groups, and as such reects the
average level of institutional complexity among the Amerindian population
residing in each state. We refer to this variable as "pre-colonial institutions"
in the remainder of the paper.
It is worth pointing out that the construction of this variable requires
the matching of ethnic groups listed under two di¤erent datasets. Indeed,
the data on population shares comes from national censuses, which we ac-
cessed individually through each nations statistical agency, while the data
11We also assign the value of 4 to the Aymaras, a large Amerindian group which was
part of the Inca empire and who were not assigned a value of Jurisdictional Hierarchy in
Murdock (1967). Our results are not dependent on this choice.
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on the characteristics of each ethnic group comes from the Ethnographic
Atlas. While a majority of groups receive the same name in the national
censuses and in the Atlas, there are a number of cases where the names as-
signed in these two sources di¤er. We used a diversity of additional material
in order to make sure that as many ethnic groups as possible were matched
- please refer to table A1 in the Appendix for details. By this procedure
we were able to increase the number of Amerindian ethnic groups matched
between these two sources to 102.12
These 102 matched Amerindian groups represent 71% of the total Amerindian
population of Latin America - albeit this percentage varies signicantly from
country to country. The fact that almost 30% of the Amerindian popula-
tion could not be matched is to be expected given that the Ethnographic
Atlas does not o¤er an exhaustive list of all groups but rather a survey of
the groups for which anthropological work is available. For the Amerindian
groups that could not be matched, we assign the minimum value of Jurisdic-
tional Hierarchy under the assumption that small and less organized groups
were more likely to remain unresearched by anthropologists. The assump-
tion is supported by the fact that all groups present in the Atlas with a value
of Jurisdictional Hierarchy equal to 1 or higher were matched to our census
data. As a robustness check, we also experiment assigning non-matched
groups a value equal to the average of all matched groups within the same
state. Figure 1, introduced in the previous section, o¤ers a visual overview
of our measure of pre-colonial institutions across all sub-national states in
the continent.
With our measure of pre-colonial institutions at hand, we investigate its
inuence on present-day socioeconomic outcomes in Latin America using
12Our data uses the most recent census available for each country, as previous versions
would have a less comprehensive coverage of the Amerindian population (for instance
not recording the exact ethnic group). It is worth mentioning that the percentage of
Amerindians in the total population may change signicantly between two censuses, as
census questions are modied and social attitudes towards Amerindians evolve. While we
cannot say much about how our results would be a¤ected if di¤erent census years were
used, we did try using two di¤erent censuses for Bolivia (2001 and 2012) as the data was
su¢ ciently detailed in these two cases. Our results were not a¤ected in any material way.
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the following econometric specication:
Ys;c = c + PCIs;c + AmPops;c + Xs;c + s;c (1)
In equation (1), Ys;c is an outcome variable such as a measure of school-
ing, health or economic well-being. Subscript s denotes sub-national states,
subscript c denotes countries, and c is a set of country-specic xed e¤ects.
PCIs;c is the measure of pre-colonial institutions described above and Xs;c
is a set of variables controlling for state characteristics such as population
density, geography, and a number of colonial and pre-colonial factors poten-
tially a¤ecting socioeconomic outcomes. Finally, AmPops;c is the share of
Amerindians in the total population of the state today, a control variable
that we single out for its importance.
The share of Amerindians in the total population today is pos-
itively related to pre-colonial institutions, as the most advanced
pre-colonial states were also the most densely populated (the cor-
relation coe¢ cient between AmPop and PCI is 0:35). This leads
us to control for the share of Amerindians today since this vari-
able will have a separate e¤ect on socioeconomic outcomes quite
distinct from the one we are trying to estimate in this paper.
Indeed, Amerindians of all ethnic groups have traditionally suf-
fered from discrimination within Latin American societies. They
usually nd it di¢ cult to be accepted in non-manual employment
and are given a low priority by national governments when it
comes to investing in education, health or public infrastructure.
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that regions with
a larger share of Amerindian population are usually characterized
by lower levels of socioeconomic success.13
13See Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994) for a detailed analysis of this issue.
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Our aim in this paper is to estimate the e¤ect of pre-colonial
institutions on socioeconomic development within the context of
societies where the descendants of pre-colonial populations are
subject to discrimination. It is therefore important to factor out
the negative e¤ect of a larger Amerindian population, which re-
sults from a larger share of people being discriminated against,
from the positive e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions that we ad-
vance. In a way, we hypothesize that while all Amerindians are
subject to discrimination, those belonging to groups with more
developed pre-colonial institutions would be able to overcome it
by organizing and successfully defending their rights in front of
the national government and society at large. It is this latter ef-
fect we try to isolate, as it is the only one directly related to the
quality of pre-colonial institutions.
Most of our analysis will include the share of Amerindians in
the population as a control variable but, for completeness, we also
run our baseline regressions without it. The overall conclusions
of our analysis do not change in this case, albeit the size and
statistical signicance of the coe¢ cients of interest is uniformly
weaker (see section 4.4).
All our regressions include country xed e¤ects as these control for a
wealth of characteristics shared by all states within the same nation. In
particular, a number of colonial and post-colonial institutional factors will
be common to all sub-national units, such as the written laws and the con-
stitution, the organization of public health and education, the balance of
power between the di¤erent branches of the government, and so on. As
we search to isolate the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions, accounting for as
many colonial and post-colonial institutional factors as possible is impor-
tant. Of course, it may still be the case that some of these factors display
variability at the sub-national level: some aspects of the law, for instance,
may be applied more stringently in the capital city as compared to far-o¤
provinces. We cannot control directly for such e¤ects, but note that if the
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way in which national institutions such as legal codes apply locally corre-
lates with the local level of pre-colonial institutions, a potential explanation
may be that more advanced pre-colonial institutions facilitate the operation
of national law. In that case, our regressions would simply be capturing an
additional indirect e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions, one that works via a
more e¤ective functioning of the post-colonial state.
We will consider as dependent variables three indicators of education
(percent of the population who completed primary education, percent who
completed secondary education, average years of schooling), one indicator of
public health (infant mortality rate), two indicators of economic well-being
(percent of the population with access to drinking water, percent with access
to electricity), and two indicators of overall economic development (GDP
per capita and poverty rates). The battery of control variables at the state
level will be discussed in the following section, as they are progressively
introduced. The sources and precise denitions of all variables used in the
paper can be found in table A2 in the Appendix.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that, given the nature of Murdocks
dataset, the variable PCIs;c may su¤er from measurement error. This, how-
ever, would only result in a bias towards zero in our estimates of coe¢ cient
: As most of our results rely on  being di¤erent from zero, we may say
that conclusions would be stronger if this variable could be measured with
more precision.
Our empirical analysis proceeds in two phases. First, section 4 analyses
the relationship between our measure of pre-colonial institutions and so-
cioeconomic success for the whole population, while section 5 will consider
ner partitions of the population within each sub-national state. The reason
for this procedure is that the number of dependent variables and the set of
controls available is much richer for the specication using the whole popu-
lation of each state. We aim to provide a more complete picture by focusing
initially on the whole population, and turning to a ner level of analysis at
the cost of less available data later on.
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Before turning to the empirical analysis, tables 1 and 2 o¤er an overview
of our data. Table 1 lists all countries in our dataset together with their total
population, the percentage of Amerindians in their population, and the per-
centage of their Amerindian population being matched to the Ethnographic
Atlas. Our data covers all 17 countries in continental Latin American for a
total of 324 sub-national states.14 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for
all variables used in our analysis.15
[Table 1]
[Table 2]
4 Empirical analysis: whole population
4.1 Baseline results
Throughout this section our dependent variable measures socioeconomic suc-
cess for the whole population of each sub-national state. We begin our
analysis with a set of regressions that illustrate how our coe¢ cient of inter-
est changes as di¤erent sets of control variables are added. All regressions
include country xed e¤ects, and results are reported in table 3. The de-
pendent variable for this initial analysis is the percentage of the population
who nished secondary schooling, in logarithmic form, but similar results
14For Brazil the population shares of di¤erent Amerindian groups is only available at the
level of regions (groups of 3 to 9 states). We assign to each Brazilian state the population
shares of the region it belongs to. For Argentina the data is available at the state level but
gives only a partial breakdown, with the population of only the main Amerindian groups
of each state being available. We complete the missing data for Argentina using national
totals for each group and assumptions about the distribution of each group outside the
states where they are most numerous. For Uruguay we do not have data on di¤erent
Amerindian groups, only the population share of all Amerindians in each state. This,
however, is not a problem for the construction of our measure of Pre-Colonial Institutions
for Uruguay as we know that all Amerindian groups in Uruguay have a value of zero for
Jurisdictional Hierarchy. For all other 14 countries we have a complete dataset giving
population shares for all Amerindian groups in every state.
15A matrix of bivariate correlations can be found as table A3 in the appendix. Correla-
tions conrm that the share of Amerindians in the population is negatively related to all
measures of socioeconomic success.
18
are obtained using our other measures of well-being. Standard errors are
clustered at the country level throughout the paper.
[Table 3]
The rst column of table 3 reports our most simple regression where only
the measure of pre-colonial institutions is included alongside xed e¤ects.
The coe¢ cient on pre-colonial institutions is already statistically signicant
at the 5% level and takes a value of 0.0376. The coe¢ cient doubles in
magnitude to 0.0893 and its statistical signicance increases to 1% in the
second column, where the share of Amerindians in the total population of
each state is added. As expected, this last variable has a strong negative
inuence on our outcome measure and its absence was responsible for a
negative bias in the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions. We are thus conrm-
ing previous research as to the overall poorer socioeconomic outcomes of
the Amerindian population, but adding a new result whereby areas where
Amerindians groups were characterized by more advanced pre-colonial in-
stitutions have better outcomes.
The next four columns of table 3 add a large number of state-specic
characteristics which may have an e¤ect on socioeconomic outcomes and
whose absence could create an omitted variable bias. In column 3 we control
for the present-day population density of each state - as the provision of
education (and public services in general) may be more costly in less densely
settled territories. As expected, areas of higher population density tend to
have better outcomes, but the e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions continues to
be large and statistically signicant.
Columns 4 to 6 deal with the important issue of geography, including
aspects such as climate, location and natural resources. Following Dia-
mond (1997), advanced pre-colonial institutions may be expected to arise
in regions with favorable geographic characteristic such as an abundance of
agricultural land, proximity to the coast, or a mild climate. If that was the
case, higher socioeconomic outcomes today may be due to the permanence
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of such geographic characteristics, and not to the superior institutions that
the groups living in these areas developed.
With this in mind, column 4 augments our baseline regression with three
indicators of climate (latitude, altitude, and temperature), an index of ter-
rain ruggedness (taking higher values when land elevation is irregular), and
an index of Malaria prevalence. Column 5 adds to this list the area of the
state in question plus three indicators of its locational advantage: distance to
the capital, distance to the sea, and a dummy for landlocked states. Column
6, nally, directly measures the most important forms of natural resource
wealth by adding an index of land suitability for agriculture and dummy
variables indicating the presence of oil or gas elds, gold or silver mines,
and any other mines.
The main result of these three columns is that the coe¢ cient on pre-
colonial institutions remains statistically signicant at the 1% level in all
cases and its magnitude is not much a¤ected. In column 6, when all controls
are included, the coe¢ cient takes a value of 0.0775 - a similar magnitude
as in column 2. Since our dependent variable is measured in logarithmic
form, this coe¢ cient indicates that an increase in the average level of pre-
colonial institutions by 1 unit is associated with an increase in secondary
school achievement of around 8%. This is a large e¤ect when we consider
an average value of secondary school achievement across all states of 41%
with a standard deviation of 15% - passing from a pre-colonial population
of tribesmen to one of multi-city chiefdoms (increase of 2 units) would lead
to a one standard deviation change in secondary schooling.
Turning to our state-specic indicators of geographic advantage, lati-
tude, terrain ruggedness, distance to the capital and distance to the sea
all appear to have a statistically signicant relationship with our outcome
variable. Latitude and ruggedness seem to pick up most of the e¤ect from
climatic factors, as neither malaria prevalence, temperature or altitude are
statistically signicant in their presence. Somewhat surprisingly, distance to
the capital is positively related to education while being landlocked appears
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to carry no additional penalty once distance to the coast has been accounted
for. Finally, none of our four indicators of natural resource wealth exerts
a statistically signicant e¤ect on secondary school achievement. Arguably,
the gains from having these resources at hand are counteracted by opposite
e¤ects much discussed in the natural resource curseliterature.
The results of table 3 may be reproduced over our full array of socioe-
conomic indicators, as shown in table 4. This table takes as its baseline the
regression reported in the last column of table 3, with all state characteris-
tics considered so far, and considers as dependent variable each of the eight
outcome measures at our disposal. Remarkably, our index of pre-colonial
institutions is consistently related with better outcomes for all of them: it is
positively related with measures of education, drinking water, electricity and
GDP per capita, and negatively related with infant mortality and poverty
rates. In all cases the relationship is statistically signicant at the 5% level
or better.
[Table 4]
The e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions is not only statistically signicant,
the magnitude of the e¤ect is also large. Since all dependent variables are
used in logarithmic form, coe¢ cients may be interpreted directly as semi-
elasticities. Interestingly, the largest e¤ects are observed for our measures of
overall economic development. A 1-unit increase in the index of pre-colonial
institutions is associated with a 19% increase in GDP per capita and a 12%
decrease in the poverty rate. The e¤ects for all other dependent variables
are in the 3 to 8% range for a 1-unit increase, in all cases a sizeable change.
4.2 Controlling for colonial economic activity
While our results so far have identied a positive relationship be-
tween pre-colonial institutions and current socioeconomic devel-
opment, the e¤ect may not be a direct one, as hypothesized so far,
but an indirect one working via the colonial process. In accordance
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with the work of Arias and Girod (2014), pre-colonial institutions
may be a major explanatory factor behind the choice of economic
activity put in place during the colony. By controlling for the dif-
ferent types of economic activity during colonial times we test for
the existence of this indirect channel, challenging the notion that
pre-colonial institutions are important in their own right with the
notion that they matter mainly because of their inuence in the
subsequent colonial period. In other words, this section o¤ers an
exploration into one potential channel linking pre-colonial insti-
tutions and current development which is di¤erent from the one
emphasized until now.
To test for this alternative explanation we take advantage of the work of
Bruhn and Gallego (2012), who investigate the role of di¤erent economic ac-
tivities put in place during colonial times on economic development in Latin
America. Bruhn and Gallego (2012) use states as the unit of analysis, which
renders their dataset compatible with ours. They classify states into four
mutually exclusive groups according to the main economic activity taking
place in their territory during the colony. These four groups are:
a) Mining. In particular the gold mines of Brazil, the silver mines of Mexico,
Peru and Bolivia, and the associated mines producing mercury for the
process of silver extraction through amalgamation.
b) Plantations. Places dedicated to the cultivation of high-value cash crops
for the export market, in particular sugarcane, tobacco and cotton.
Plantations relied essentially on slave labour.
c) Other colonial activities. Places where the dominant economic activity
was agricultural production for the local market (from Amerindian
lands or from latifundia) and industry.
d) No colonial activities. Places where the colonial state had marginal or
no inuence, like remote parts of the Amazonian rainforest and the
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extreme south of Argentina and Chile.16
We incorporate in our regressions dummy variables for the rst three
types of economic activities, leaving the case of no colonial activities as our
excluded category. If the e¤ects of pre-colonial institutions only works via
colonial activities, the inclusion of these controls would render our coe¢ cient
of interest small and not signicant. Results are reported in table 5, where
all regressions include country xed e¤ects and our full range of baseline
controls.
[Table 5]
Table 5 is strongly supportive of our thesis. Indeed, our measure of
pre-colonial institutions continues to have a positive and statistically signif-
icant e¤ect on the eight dependent variables we consider. The size of the
coe¢ cients is not much a¤ected with respect to table 4, only the e¤ects on
educational achievement and electricity provision are reduced to some ex-
tent. This indicates that the relationship between pre-colonial institutional
development and present-day outcomes is largely not mediated by the type
of economic activity put in place during the colony - in accordance with our
thesis.
Turning to the e¤ects of colonial activities on present-day outcomes, ta-
ble 5 gives us a mixed picture. The e¤ect seems clearest on overall measures
of economic development, as states associated with mining and plantation
agriculture have lower levels of GDP per capita than states left untouched
by the colonial economy. This is in line with Bruhn and Gallego (2012), who
base most of their analysis on the e¤ects on GDP per capita. For other mea-
sures of socioeconomic development, however, the evidence is less conclusive.
Areas where slave-based plantations were located are indeed characterized
16Bruhn and Gallego (2012) combine the information on the type of economic activity
in each state with data on pre-colonial population density to produce a classication into
three types of colonial activities which they refer to as "bad", "good" and "ugly". We
dont follow their approach as it incorporates value judgements as to what is believed to
be "good" or "bad" (let alone "ugly"). The classication of colonial activities into mining,
plantations, and others is much less likely to be a¤ected by our own beliefs.
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by lower secondary education and higher infant mortality (statistically sig-
nicant at the 10% level), while areas where mining activities took place
have higher poverty rates (statistically signicant at the 5% level). On the
other hand, no further statistically signicant e¤ects are estimated for any of
the other socioeconomic outcomes we consider - albeit estimated coe¢ cients
have usually the expected sign. Overall, while colonial activities may well
play a role in determining current development outcomes, our results show
that their consideration does not diminish the importance of pre-colonial
institutions.
4.3 Controlling for other pre-colonial characteristics
If the results so far clearly point towards a persistent role of pre-colonial
institutions on current socioeconomic development, one may still argue that
pre-colonial features other than institutional complexity may explain our
ndings. As we mentioned briey, institutional complexity usually corre-
lates with economic development, and it is possible that richer pre-colonial
societies were able to adapt better and take advantage of the new colonial
environment simply because of their wealth. Furthermore, the Ethnographic
Atlas provides a large array of cultural and economic practices of the so-
cieties it surveys. We are therefore in a position to control for a number
of pre-colonial characteristics other than the complexity of their political
structure - and we do so in what follows.
We start with overall economic development in pre-colonial times. Clearly,
measures of income per head are not available for this time period in the
Americas, but we may follow much of the relevant literature and rely on
estimates of population density as a proxy for overall economic development
(see, for instance, Acemoglu et al. 2002). The data on pre-colonial popu-
lation density at the state level comes from Bruhn and Gallego (2012), and
table 6 adds this variable as an additional control to the regressions reported
in table 5.17 Furthermore, the variable on pre-colonial population density is
17We note that table 6 is thus controlling for both pre-colonial and present-day popu-
lation density. The correlation between these two variables is positive but not too high
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interesting in its own right, as it is a means to test the "reversal of fortune"
hypothesis, whereby areas which were richer than average prior to the ar-
rival of Europeans would have a tendency to be poorer than average today
(Acemoglu et al. 2002).
[Table 6]
Once again, results are fully consistent with the thesis of this paper. The
coe¢ cient on pre-colonial institutions is hardly a¤ected by the inclusion
of this variable and remains statistically signicant for all the dependent
variables we consider. It is not the case, then, that areas of high institutional
development are better o¤because of an initial advantage in terms of wealth.
Turning to the "reversal of fortune" hypothesis, this is only partially
supported by our results - the coe¢ cient on pre-colonial population density
having the expected negative e¤ect on socioeconomic development only for
our measures of education, GDP per capita and poverty rates. Statistical
signicance is reached only for GDP per capita, in accordance with previous
ndings in the literature.18
In table 7 we take an additional step and control for nine social and eco-
nomic characteristics of pre-colonial societies other than their institutional
complexity. These characteristics are the fraction of the population dedi-
cated to gathering, hunting, shing and agriculture; their typical pattern
of settlement (from fully nomadic to compact and permanent settlements);
their degree of class stratication; a dummy for the existence of slavery; a
dummy for the existence of elections in determining leader succession and,
nally, a dummy for the existence of inheritance rules for property (see ta-
ble A2 in the Appendix for detailed denitions). To construct each of them,
(0:47): While Europeans did settle in larger numbers near the areas of high Amerindian
population during colonial times, the trend reversed strongly following independence.
Some of the most densely populated regions in present-day Latin America, such as the
areas around the cities of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires and Santiago, were
very sparsely populated in the year 1500.
18For alternative views on the reversal of fortune hypothesis see Chanda et al. (2014)
and Maloney and Valencia (forthcoming). We note that, contrary to the rest of the
literature, we are testing the reversal of fortune only among Latin American countries.
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we proceed as for our measure of pre-colonial institutions: we calculate the
population-weighted average among all Amerindian groups present in the
state.19
It is interesting to note that variables such as the existence of elections (a
measure of proto-democracy) and the existence of inheritance rules (a mea-
sure of proto-property rights) are essentially uncorrelated with our measure
of pre-colonial institutions (bivariate correlation of  0:04 with the rst one
and 0:10 with the second one). Thus, political complexity is truly a separate
dimension along which societies may be described, and its e¤ects may be
quite distinct from those of democracy or property rights.
Each of these additional pre-colonial characteristics is considered sepa-
rately in the columns of table 7, with the exception of the rst four measures,
all relating to the economic activity of the population, which are included
simultaneously in column 2.20 The regressions also control for the di¤erent
colonial activities as in table 5 and for pre-colonial population density as in
table 6, besides all the state-specic characteristics that have been included
all along. The dependent variable is the percentage of the population with
secondary education.
[Table 7]
As table 7 makes clear, the inclusion of these additional pre-colonial char-
acteristics does not challenge the importance of pre-colonial institutions. In
all regressions the coe¢ cient on our measure of pre-colonial institutions re-
mains positive and statistically signicant at the 1% level. The magnitude of
the coe¢ cient is remarkably consistent, uctuating closely around the value
of 0.0700 in all but one case (column 2, where the coe¢ cient equals 0.0918).
Thus, the coe¢ cient is usually very similar to what is obtained before any of
19For the Amerindian groups that could not be matched to the Atlas we assign a value
equal to the average value of all other groups within the state. Uruguay is excluded from
table 8 as we dont have enough data to calculate these additional variables for it.
20These four variables do not sum up to 1, as a fraction of the population may be
counted in more than one of them, and sometimes in none of them.
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these additional pre-colonial characteristics is controlled for (rst column of
table 8). In most cases, the additional pre-colonial characteristic considered
turns out to have no statistically signicant e¤ect on development. In par-
ticular, nascent forms of democracy (column 6) and property rights (column
7) are not associated with better outcomes today. This reinforces our thesis,
which regards institutional complexity as the crucial aspect of pre-colonial
societies a¤ecting socioeconomic development.
The exercise of table 7 may be reproduced using the other seven depen-
dent variables considered previously. While we do not report these results
for conciseness, we have carried them out and the importance of pre-colonial
institutions is never challenged. The sign and statistical signicance of pre-
colonial institutions carries through for all seven alternative outcome vari-
ables and in essentially all specications considered in table 7 (results are
available upon request).
4.4 Robustness checks
We have carried out a number of robustness checks on the above results,
some of which we have already referred to. First, we assign to all non-
matched Amerindian groups from our census data a value of the index of
Jurisdictional Hierarchy equal to the average value of all matched groups
within the state (instead of a value of 0). Second, we have tried assigning
di¤erent values of Jurisdictional Hierarchy to the Aztec and Inca groups, the
two largest in Latin America. One variation assigns the maximum value of 4
to the Aztecs, bringing them in line with the Incas. Another variation brings
the Inca value down to 2, in line with the Aztecs and other ethnic groups.
This last change de facto reduces the range of our measure of institutional
development from 0-4 to 0-2. Finally, we have tried excluding Brazil and
Argentina from our regressions, as these two countries do not have complete
data on the ethnic composition of their population at the state level. In
all cases, our results carry through all these checks unchallenged with only
minor quantitative changes in the estimated coe¢ cients.
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Following our previous discussion about the role of the share of Amerindi-
ans in the total population as a control variable, we have also estimated all
baseline regressions without this control. The results, reported in table
A4 in the appendix, are still supportive of our thesis as the coe¢ cients on
pre-colonial institutions continue to be associated with higher levels of so-
cioeconomic development across the board. On the other hand, and given
that the negative e¤ect of discrimination is not factored out, the coe¢ cients
are smaller in magnitude and reach statistical signicance in only two cases
(secondary education and poverty rates).
There is also a point in carrying out our regressions using a more parsi-
monious approach to the set of controls included. In the preceding sections,
we have always expanded our control set when additional variables are con-
sidered - a correct approach if all the controls are exogenous but problematic
if some of them happen to be endogenous. An alternatively approach would
see us adding each additional control variable separately to our baseline re-
gression, and we have also proceeded this way. Results are reported in table
A5 in the appendix, and demonstrate that the conclusions of our analysis
are unchanged by this procedure.
5 Empirical results: extensions
Our results so far provide solid evidence for a positive e¤ect of pre-colonial
institutions on the socioeconomic development of the whole population at
sub-national level. While these results are in accordance with our thesis,
they would also conrm alternative stories linking the pre-colonial past with
the present - for instance, a di¤erent mechanism intermediating between
pre-colonial institutions and outcomes, or a di¤erent explanation for the
persistence of these institutions. The objective of the present section is to
o¤er additional evidence which narrows down the set of acceptable expla-
nations for the results presented so far, and further conrm the plausibility
of the thesis we advance. Within each sub-national state, we compare re-
sults for urban as opposed to rural areas and for Amerindians as opposed to
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non-Amerindian people. While data at this level of aggregation is available
only for a subset of the variables considered so far, the results are worth
highlighting.
5.1 Comparing rural and urban regions
As we have argued in section 2, our thesis emphasizes the survival of pre-
colonial institutional capacity thanks to the existence of a "Republic of In-
dians" throughout rural Latin America. If this hypothesis is correct, we
should nd that the positive relationship between pre-colonial institutions
and socioeconomic development is stronger among rural areas: Amerindians
living in rural areas would have a larger capacity to organize e¤ectively and
have their demands addressed.
To test this aspect of our thesis, we have gathered data allowing us to
run separate regressions for the rural and urban regions of Latin America
at the level of sub-national states. We were able to nd separate values
for the rural and urban regions of each state for four dependent variables
(primary education, secondary education, access to drinking water, access
to electricity) and for the ethnic composition of the population, which al-
lows us to calculate the percentage of Amerindians in the total population
and to construct distinct measures of pre-colonial institutions for the rural
and urban regions of each state. We have also included our control set for
geography, climate and natural resources, but the values of these controls
do not change between the rural and urban area of any given state.21
As it turns out, the results of this exercise clearly support our thesis -
as reported in table 8. We consider the four dependent variables mentioned
above, and for each case run separate regressions using only rural areas
and only urban areas. The e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions is positive and
statistically signicant for the four cases covering rural areas, while only two
of the four cases covering urban areas reach statistical signicance. More
21Argentina is omitted from this exercise, as there is no information on the distribution
of its Amerindian population between urban and rural areas.
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important, the coe¢ cient on pre-colonial institutions is always much larger
for rural areas - between two and three times larger for primary education,
secondary education and drinking water, and larger still for electricity. As
an example, a one-unit increase in the measure of pre-colonial institutions
would be associated with an increase of 8.6% in secondary education in rural
areas against an increase of 3.2% in urban areas. We conclude that these
results further solidify our thesis.
[Table 8]
5.2 Comparing Amerindians with non-Amerindians
As we discussed in section 2, the mechanism we put forward would explain
why Amerindians benet from more advanced pre-colonial institutions, and
hypothesized that the externalities of the process of development mean that
non-Amerindians would benet as well. So far there has been no way of
knowing whether the positive e¤ect on development that we nd takes place
only among Amerindians, among both Amerindians and non-Amerindians,
and how the magnitudes of these two channels compare.
To shed some light on this issue, we have managed to gather sepa-
rate measures of primary and secondary education for the Amerindian and
non-Amerindian population at the level of sub-national states for all Latin
American countries except Brazil. We run separate regressions using only
Amerindians and only non-Amerindians, and control for all state-specic
aspects considered so far. Our results are reported in table 9 and reveal a
number of points.
[Table 9]
First, table 9 brings support to the idea that the positive e¤ect of pre-
colonial institutions concerns both Amerindians and non-Amerindians: the
coe¢ cient of interest is positive in all cases and statistically signicant
in three of them. Thus, the notion that some form of positive external-
ity favouring non-Amerindians is in place seems reinforced. Second, and
30
as expected, the estimated e¤ect is larger for Amerindians than for non-
Amerindians, although the di¤erence is perhaps not as large as one may
have anticipated (the coe¢ cient for Amerindians is about 60% larger for
primary education and about 20% larger for secondary education). Further
investigation into the mechanisms behind these results is clearly an avenue
for future research, but at this point the hypothesis that pre-colonial insti-
tutional development is benecial for the population at large can be upheld.
Finally, as an additional test to our ndings, we have looked for evidence
of the positive e¤ect of pre-colonial institutions on the total population at an
earlier time period. The data requirements for this exercise cannot be met
for Latin America as a whole, but an analysis using only Mexican states has
been possible. We collected historical data on literacy rates and on the ethnic
composition of the population using the Mexican censuses of 1921, 1930 and
1950. After constructing our measure of pre-colonial institutions using the
ethnic composition of the population in 1930 and 1950 (the years for which
it is available), we run a set of regressions similar to those performed so far in
the paper using literacy rates as the dependent variable. The results, which
can be found in table A6 in the appendix, show that a positive relationship
is indeed in place - although the number of observations at our disposal is
too limited for coe¢ cients to reach standard levels of statistical signicance.
Overall, the additional ndings reported in this section substantially
increase our condence on the validity of the thesis put forward all along
this paper.
6 Concluding remarks
If one thing has been learned from the last two decades of research on eco-
nomic development over the very long run it is that the past cannot be
easily cast aside. Every society builds on the successes and mistakes of its
predecessors, and inherits a set of rules and institutions that are usually
modied only gradually. While this seems obviously true for the "winners"
of economic history, the European nations that colonized the world, it is
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also the case for the "losers", those nations being colonized. What came
out of the colonizing process throughout the world was not a mirror image
of European society but a new reality where pre-colonial culture and insti-
tutions survived, often below a layer of o¢ cial or dominant culture. These
two layers interact and modify each other, and both of them ought to be
considered in the study of todays developing countries.
This paper brings support to the above assertions, and adds to the sub-
stantive evidence already in place for the case of Africa. As our empirical
results show, Latin American pre-colonial institutions - and more precisely
the degree of political complexity - are powerful predictors of present-day
measures of socioeconomic development. Several aspects render our evi-
dence particularly convincing. First, our results are obtained controlling for
country xed e¤ects, thus factoring out many institutional factors playing a
role at the national level. Second, we introduce a large array of controls for
geographic factors including climate, location and the presence of natural
resources. Third, we consider additional historical forces such as the type
of economic activity in place during the colony and the economic and social
prole of pre-colonial societies (besides their institutional complexity). Fi-
nally, we show how the inuence of pre-colonial institutions is far stronger
in rural areas, which is in accordance with the historical account we give
for the transmission of pre-colonial factors, and that both Amerindians and
non-Amerindians appear to benet.
The present paper, together with the literature it contributes to, en-
hances our understanding of how developing countries got to where they are
now. Understanding this is important in its own right, and increases the
chances of making the right decisions when considering where they head to
in the future.
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Figure 1 
Pre-colonial institutions in Latin America 
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Table 1 
Latin American countries and their Amerindian populations 
 
 
Country 
 
Total population 
 
Amerindian 
population as % of 
total population 
 
Amerindian population 
matched to Ethnographic Atlas 
as % of total Amerindian 
population  
 
Number of 
states  
     
Argentina 40,117,096 2.8% 25% 24 
Bolivia 10,059,856 41% 84% 9 
Brazil 190,755,799 0.4% 38% 27 
Chile  15,116,385 4.6% 96% 13 
Colombia 41,174,853 3.4% 47% 33 
Costa Rica 4,301,712 1.6% 26% 7 
Ecuador 14,451,115 7% 42% 24 
El Salvador 57,44,113 0.2% 15% 14 
Guatemala 11,237,196 39% 62% 8 
Honduras 6,076,885 6.3% 96% 18 
Mexico 103,263,388 5.7% 77% 32 
Nicaragua  5,483,447 8% 27% 17 
Panama 3,405,813 12% 29% 12 
Paraguay 5,163,198 1.7% 55% 18 
Peru 27,412,157 15% 96% 25 
Uruguay 3,285,877 2% 100% 19 
Venezuela 27,225,775 2.8% 79% 24 
     
TOTAL 514,274,665 5% 71% 324 
     
 
 
 
  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables: 
Infant mortality rate 324 20.6 10.8 1.4 56.4 
Years of  schooling 319 5.98 2.13 1.03 11.45 
Primary school achievement 324 0.81 0.16 0.29 0.96 
Secondary school achievement 324 0.41 0.15 0.05 0.75 
Drinking water  324 0.86 0.17 0.05 0.99 
Electricity  324 0.84 0.19 0.03 0.99 
PPP GDP per capita 300 5763.52 4722.30   1248.88 40449.09 
Poverty rate 272 29.18 20.78 1.23 81.67 
      
Main variable of interest:       
Measure of pre-colonial institutions 324 0.57 1.06 0 3.99 
      
Baseline control variables:      
Share of Amerindians in total population 324 0.11 0.19 0.00001 0.96 
Population density 324 394.9 3407.41 0.13 58706.88 
Land Suitability Index 321 0.56 0.29 0.002 0.998 
Malaria Stability Index 321 1.3 1.4 0 5 
Latitude  324 16.02 10.73 0.015 54.33 
Altitude (km.) 324 0.68 0.92 0 4.33 
Temperature (Celsius) 319 20.72 5.28 4.7 27.77 
Ruggedness Index 324 1.43 1.07 0 4.75 
Land area (sq. km.) 324 63786.14 151196.8 44 1600000 
Landlocked dummy 324 0.54 0.49 0 1 
Distance to capital (km.) 324 464.08 477.69 0 2559.34 
Inverse distance to coast 320 0.89 0.1 0.54 0.99 
Oil & Gas dummy 324 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Gold & Silver dummy 324 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Other mines dummy 324 0.23 0.42 0 1 
 
Additional control variables      
Colonial activities      
Mining  283 0.14841 0.356136 0 1 
Plantations 283 0.081272 0.273737 0 1 
Other colonial activities 283 0.650177 0.477759 0 1 
No colonial activities  283 0.120141 0.325703 0 1 
      
Pre-colonial characteristics      
Log of pre-colonial population density 301 0.51 2.42 -9.58 5.97 
Gathering  324 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.43 
Hunting 324 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.40 
Fishing 324 0.10 0.06 0.02 0.31 
Agriculture   324 0.47 0.21 0.02 0.93 
Settlement Pattern 324 5.11 1.74 0.15 7.98 
Class Stratification 324 2.03 1.19 0 4.99 
Slavery 324 0.21 0.34 0 1 
Elections 324 0.06 0.20 0 0.99 
Inheritance Rules for Property   324 0.22 0.37 0 1 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Baseline results 
 
Dependent variable: Percent of the population having completed Secondary education (in logs)  
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0376** 0.0893*** 0.0750*** 0.0780*** 0.0811*** 0.0775*** 
 [0.0148] [0.0214] [0.0237] [0.0211] [0.0199] [0.0196] 
       
Share of Amerindian population  -0.746*** -0.632** -0.586** -0.597** -0.582** 
  [0.192] [0.222] [0.223] [0.223] [0.222] 
       
Log population density   0.0279** 0.0366** 0.0533*** 0.0574*** 
   [0.0105] [0.0137] [0.0151] [0.0123] 
       
Latitude    0.00808** 0.00931*** 0.00916*** 
    [0.00303] [0.00281] [0.00267] 
       
Malaria Stability Index    -0.00733 -0.0113 -0.0102 
    [0.0139] [0.0125] [0.0122] 
       
Temperature (Celsius)    -0.00456 -0.00679 -0.00557 
    [0.00436] [0.00480] [0.00463] 
       
Altitude  (km.)    -0.0241 -0.0243 -0.0277 
    [0.0159] [0.0170] [0.0178] 
       
Ruggedness Index    -0.0610** -0.0542** -0.0534** 
    [0.0227] [0.0212] [0.0217] 
       
Land area (sq. km.)     3.56e-08 1.73e-08 
     [8.39e-08] [8.10e-08] 
       
Landlocked dummy     -0.0650 -0.0572 
     [0.0527] [0.0505] 
       
Distance to capital (km.)     6.80e-05*** 5.79e-05 
     [2.13e-05] [3.63e-05] 
       
Inverse distance to coast     -0.856*** -0.822** 
     [0.274] [0.289] 
       
Land Suitability Index      -0.0584 
      [0.125] 
       
Oil & Gas dummy      0.00740 
      [0.0318] 
       
Gold & Silver dummy      0.0457 
      [0.0425] 
       
Other mines dummy      0.0159 
      [0.0334] 
       
Country Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 324 324 324 317 317 317 
Adjusted R-squared 0.703 0.767 0.775 0.787 0.794 0.793 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
Table 4 
Baseline results with 8 different dependent variables 
 
         
Dependent variable Infant 
Mortality 
Years of 
Schooling 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Drinking 
water 
Electricity Log GDP per 
capita 
Poverty rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0631*** 0.0510** 0.0248** 0.0775*** 0.0562*** 0.0827*** 0.190** -0.115*** 
 [0.0195] [0.0176] [0.0103] [0.0196] [0.0181] [0.0265] [0.0814] [0.0379] 
         
Controls included:         
         
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log population density  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural 
resources  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 317 316 317 317 317 317 297 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.787 0.821 0.878 0.793 0.504 0.651 0.641 0.847 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
  
 Table 5 
Controlling for colonial activities  
 
         
Dependent variable: Infant 
Mortality 
Years of 
Schooling 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Drinking 
water 
Electricity Log GDP 
per capita 
Poverty 
rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0643*** 0.0394** 0.0162** 0.0642*** 0.0489** 0.0563** 0.190** -0.117** 
 [0.0209] [0.0140] [0.00608] [0.0170] [0.0212] [0.0228] [0.0802] [0.0436] 
         
Other colonial activities  0.0454 -0.0188 -0.00608 -0.0321 -0.0519 -0.0249 -0.124 0.139 
 [0.0501] [0.0260] [0.00792] [0.0352] [0.0353] [0.0189] [0.108] [0.120] 
         
Mining colonial activities 0.00516 0.00375 0.0160 0.0145 -0.0450 -0.00881 -0.302** 0.279** 
 [0.0671] [0.0510] [0.0108] [0.0611] [0.0468] [0.0216] [0.125] [0.116] 
         
Plantation colonial activities 0.162* -0.0796 -0.0139 -0.124* -0.0504 -0.0631 -0.330* 0.335 
 [0.0903] [0.0597] [0.0200] [0.0643] [0.0302] [0.0449] [0.159] [0.224] 
         
Controls included:         
         
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural resources  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 280 279 280 280 280 280 279 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.774 0.822 0.916 0.817 0.476 0.734 0.612 0.851 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
 Table 6 
Controlling for pre-colonial characteristics: population density  
 
         
Dependent variable: Infant 
Mortality 
Years of 
Schooling 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Drinking 
water 
Electricity Log GDP 
per capita 
Poverty 
rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0634*** 0.0402** 0.0167** 0.0664*** 0.0473** 0.0558** 0.200** -0.122** 
 [0.0201] [0.0140] [0.00601] [0.0175] [0.0198] [0.0228] [0.0764] [0.0464] 
         
Pre-colonial population density -0.00609 -0.00593 -0.00439 -0.0158 0.0114 0.00390 -0.0697* 0.0352 
 [0.0223] [0.00769] [0.00432] [0.0111] [0.0102] [0.00792] [0.0351] [0.0249] 
         
Other colonial activities  0.0493 -0.0151 -0.00331 -0.0221 -0.0591 -0.0273 -0.0804 0.117 
 [0.0572] [0.0255] [0.00832] [0.0313] [0.0410] [0.0195] [0.101] [0.114] 
         
Mining colonial activities 0.00783 0.00633 0.0180 0.0215 -0.0500 -0.0105 -0.272** 0.263** 
 [0.0690] [0.0504] [0.0109] [0.0578] [0.0513] [0.0212] [0.120] [0.113] 
         
Plantation colonial activities 0.169 -0.0726 -0.00865 -0.105 -0.0640 -0.0678 -0.247 0.293 
 [0.0982] [0.0610] [0.0209] [0.0635] [0.0386] [0.0480] [0.151] [0.222] 
         
Controls included:         
         
Share of ethnic population YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural resources   YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 280 279 280 280 280 280 279 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.773 0.822 0.916 0.818 0.476 0.733 0.626 0.853 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
  
Table 7 
Controlling for pre-colonial characteristics: socioeconomic factors  
 
Dependent variable: Percent of the population having completed Secondary education (in logs) 
 
        
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0673*** 0.0918*** 0.0723*** 0.0657** 0.0674*** 0.0685*** 0.0682*** 
 [0.0177] [0.0195] [0.0187] [0.0267] [0.0177] [0.0188] [0.0197] 
        
Pre-colonial population density -0.0232 -0.0183 -0.0241 -0.0232 -0.0231 -0.0241 -0.0231 
 [0.0138] [0.0125] [0.0140] [0.0138] [0.0137] [0.0137] [0.0137] 
        
Other colonial activities  -0.0306 -0.0332 -0.0337 -0.0301 -0.0313 -0.0325 -0.0313 
 [0.0354] [0.0361] [0.0361] [0.0362] [0.0387] [0.0349] [0.0364] 
        
Mining colonial activities 0.0144 0.00658 0.00896 0.0155 0.0134 0.0125 0.0140 
 [0.0575] [0.0531] [0.0559] [0.0530] [0.0644] [0.0555] [0.0583] 
        
Plantation colonial activities -0.107 -0.116* -0.104 -0.106 -0.107 -0.110 -0.108 
 [0.0702] [0.0633] [0.0749] [0.0712] [0.0723] [0.0695] [0.0717] 
        
Population employed in:        
        
   Gathering  0.783      
  [0.448]      
        
   Hunting  -0.160      
  [0.365]      
        
   Fishing  1.320**      
  [0.473]      
        
   Agriculture  -0.208      
  [0.158]      
        
Settlement pattern   -0.0247     
   [0.0220]     
        
Class Stratification    0.00277    
    [0.0307]    
        
Slavery     -0.00543   
     [0.0563]   
        
Elections      -0.0818  
      [0.0908]  
        
Property rights       -0.0211 
       [0.0600] 
        
Controls included:         
 
       
Share of ethnic population YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural resources  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 261 261 261 261 261 261 261 
Adjusted R-squared 0.812 0.823 0.814 0.811 0.811 0.812 0.811 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Uruguay has been removed from the sample for this table.   
 
  
 Table 8 
Contrasting rural and urban areas  
 
Dependent variable: Primary education Secondary education Drinking water Electricity 
 rural urban rural urban rural urban rural urban 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0239** 0.00914** 0.0865*** 0.0325** 0.0860** 0.0415 0.126*** 0.00668 
 [0.0100] [0.00394] [0.0226] [0.0131] [0.0379] [0.0272] [0.0382] [0.00583] 
         
Controls included:         
         
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Log population density YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural 
resources  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 291 290 291 290 291 290 291 290 
Adjusted R-squared 0.886 0.934 0.828 0.886 0.615 0.229 0.694 0.618 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Argentina has been removed from the sample for this table. 
 
  
 Table 9 
Comparing Amerindians with non-Amerindians  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Brazil is not in the sample for this table. 
 
Dependent variable: Primary education Secondary education 
 Amerindians non-Amerindians Amerindians non-Amerindians 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Pre-Colonial Institutions 0.0233 0.0148* 0.0844** 0.0720*** 
 [0.0197] [0.00794] [0.0344] [0.0222] 
     
Controls included:     
     
Share of Amerindian pop. YES YES YES YES 
Log population density YES YES YES YES 
Geography, location and natural 
resources  
YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
     
Observations 252 253 252 253 
Adjusted R-squared 0.814 0.896 0.697 0.853 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Matching of ethnic groups 
Panel A: Ethnic groups with similar or same names in the Ethnographic Atlas and in the Census 
 
Alacalufe, Apinayé, Aymara, Bacairi, Bororo, Botocudo, Bribri, Cakchique, Camayura, Caraja, Chacobo, Chamacoco, Chichimec, Chinantec, Chiriguan, Chorote, Chorti, Cocama, Cubeo, Curipaco, Guató, 
Huichol, Kuikuru, Lenca, Macusi, Mam, Mapuche, Mataco, Maya, Mazateco, Miskito, Mixe, Mixteco, Mundurucu, Nambicuar, Ona, Palikur, Papago, Paressi, Piaroa, Pima, Popoluca, Qhiche, Sanema, Shavante, 
Sherente, Seri, Siriono, Tarahumar Tapirapé, Tehuelche, Tenetehar, Toba, Totonac, Trumai, Tupinamba, Tzeltal, Umotina, Waiwai, Wuitoto, Yagua, Yanomamo, Yaqui, Zapotec, Zoque 
 
Panel B: Ethnic groups with different names in the Ethnographic Atlas and in the Census 
 
Name in Atlas  
 
Name in Census  
 
Source of matching  
Aweikoma Kaingang Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group mainly from Brazil. Amongst other ethnonyms Aweikoma is also known as 
Coroado, Cayapa, etc.  
 
Aztec Nahualt Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at http://www.britannica.com/ Amerindian group from Central Mexico. Nahualt is the language spoken and disseminated 
by the Aztec Empire.  
 
Caduveo Kadiwéu, Guaikurú Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Paraguay and Brazil. Amongst other ethnonyms they are also known as 
Caduvi, Kaiwa, etc.  
 
Campa Ashaninka Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America- and Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/  Ashaninka belongs to one 
of the seven main groups of Amerindian group known as Campa. Ashaninkas tend to be found in remote areas in Peru and Brazil.  
 
Cayapa Chachi Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at http://www.britannica.com/ Amerindian group from the west coasts of Ecuador that traditionally was known as Cayapas. 
Nowadays, they called themselves as Chachis.  
 
Cayua Guarani, Guarani Kaiowá, 
Guarani Mbya, Guarani 
Nhandeva, Ava-Guarani, 
Tupi-Guarani, Pai-Tavytera, 
Guarani Occident. 
Métraux (1948). The Guaraní. In Steward, Julian H. (ed.), Handbook of South American Indians, Vol. 3; and Ethnologue: Language of the World 
https://www.ethnologue.com/ Guarani encompasses a wider range of alternative names. Guarani can be found across Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Brazil; 
and in each country the name of this group is used in different ways. For example, Bolivia classifies all type of Guarani-related groups under a single name 
known simply as Guarani – at least as it is reported in the recent census of 2012-. In Brazil, instead, it can be found three types of Guarani groups – Kaiowá, 
Mbya and Nhandeva-. However, all these names came to be labelled in the 18th century. Even the very single name of Guarani was introduced by the colonisers 
to differentiate those Amerindians that assimilated quickly the colonial power from those who rejected it, the latters in which case were identified by their pre-
colonial name known as Cayua. A problem arises when in modern times those Amerindians who live in rural areas, and therefore have had hardly any external 
influence in their local matters, like to be called also as Guaranis. To overcome such a confusing association it seems that within the anthropological literature 
Guaranis are identified as Cayuas. And it is precisely this way that Murdock (1967) labelled them. We then proceed to aggregate all type of Guarani-related 
groups into a single classification: Cayuas.  
 
 CONTINUED… 
 
Panel B: Ethnic groups with different names in the Ethnographic Atlas and in the Census 
 
Name in Atlas  
 
Name in Census  
 
Source of matching  
Chibcha Muisca Encyclopedia Britannica. Available at http://www.britannica.com/ Amerindian group mainly from Colombia. It is regarded as the second most influential group 
outside the Inca Empire in South America.  
 
Choco Embera Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group that lives in Colombia, Ecuador and Panama. Amongst other ethnonyms they are 
also known as Cholo, Meme, Catio, etc.  
   
Cocopa Cucapá Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/ Amerindian group from the northern Mexico who is also known as Kikima, Cocopah, etc.   
 
Cuna Tule Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group that predominately lives in Panama but a few of them can also be found in 
Colombia. The name Cuna is more related to their cultural origins than the actual name they like to be used -Tule. 
   
Goajiro Wayuu Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Colombia and Venezuela. The name Goajiro is meant to have been 
introduced by Spanish colonisers.  
 
Guahibo  Sikuani  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Colombia and Venezuela. The name Guahibo is from pre-colonial origins 
whereas Sikuani is a term labelled by them in recent times to encompass the whole groups under Guahibo heritage.  
 
Inca Quechua  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group that lives in Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru. As its northern 
counterpart, Quechuas is the language spoken and disseminated by the Inca Empire. All these countries with Inca heritage identify this group as Quechuas. 
 
Jivaro  Achuar, Shuar, Shiwiar  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America; and Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/ Amerindian group mainly 
from Ecuador. They are also known as Givari, Zibaro, etc.   
 
Lengua  Enlhet, Enxet  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America; and Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/ One of the dozens hunter-
gatherer bands of the Gran Chaco in Paraguay.  The other ethnonyms used are Lengua-Sur and Lengua-Maskoi.  
 
Paez Nasa Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group that lives in Colombia. Paez is the language spoken by this group and instead 
they called themselves as Nasa.  
 
Paraujano  Añu  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Venezuela. Nowadays they called themselves as Añu. 
 
Piapoco  Tzase  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Colombia and Venezuela. Amongst other ethnonyms they are also known 
as Yapaco, Cuipoco, Deja, etc.  
 
CONTINUED… 
 
Panel B: Ethnic groups with different names between Atlas and Census 
 
Name in Atlas  
 
Name in Census  
 
Source of matching  
Tarasco  Purépecha Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VIII –Middle America and the Caribbean. Amerindian group from western Central Mexico. The term Purépecha comes 
from pre-colonial times whereas Tarasco was introduced during contact with Spanish colonisers.  
 
Taulipang Pemon Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America.  Amerindian group from Venezuela and Brazil. Amongst other ethnonyms they are also known as 
Arekuna or Taurepan.  
 
Tucuna Tikuna,  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group that live nearby the Amazon in Brazil, Colombia and Peru. Tucuna is a term 
with foreign origin. There are other ethnonyms to identify this group such as Jaunas, Tocunas, etc.  
 
Tunebo  U`wa  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group mainly from Colombia. Amongst other ethnonyms they are also known as 
Covari, Luna, Tame, etc.  
 
Warrua  Warao  Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/; and Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group mainly 
from Venezuela. Warao is a self-name meaning “lowland people”. Amongst other ethnonyms they are also known as Guarauno or Tiuitiuia.  
 
Yahgan  Yámana   Ethnologue: Language of the World https://www.ethnologue.com/ Amerindian group that lives in Chile and Argentina. This group is also identified as 
Tequenica.  
 
Yaruro  Pumé  Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Venezuela. Pumé is a term commonly used amongst people within this 
group. On the other hand, Yaruro is meant to be a term mostly used by non-Amerindians in Venezuela. They are also known as Capuruchano and Saruro.  
 
Yupa  Yukpa Encyclopedia of World Cultures, Vol. VII –South America. Amerindian group from Venezuela. The difference between Yupa and Yukpa is only based on 
dialectic. This group is also identified as Yuko.  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Definitions and sources of variables (baseline analysis) 
 
Variable  
 
Description  
  
Dependent variables: 
 
 
Infant Mortality Rates  The number of deaths of children under 1 year old in a given year per 1000 live births in each state. Source: Country’s national statistics office   
Drinking Water Proportion of households in each state that have access to drinking water.  Source:  Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s 
national statistics office 
 
Electricity  Proportion of households in each state that have electricity. Source:  Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s national statistics 
office 
 
Average Years of  Schooling Average of years of schooling from primary level onwards of population aged 15 and above in each state. Most  recent value available in period between 1990 and 2006. 
Source: Gennaioli et al. (2013) 
 
Primary Education Proportion of total population in each state that completed primary education. Source:  Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s 
national statistics office 
 
Secondary Education Proportion of total population in each state that completed secondary education. Source:  Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  
country’s national statistics office 
 
Log GDP per capita Annual Log Gross Domestic Product per capita in each state as calculated by Bruhn and Gallego (2012) & Acemoglu, D.; Gallego, F. Robinson, J. A (2014)  
Poverty rates  Annual Log Poverty rates as calculated by Bruhn and Gallegos (2012). 
Main regressor of interest :  
Index of Pre-colonial Institutions As described in text. Source: Gray (1999) , A Corrected Ethnographic Atlas;  Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s national 
statistics offices 
Other independent variables:  
Share of Amerindian Population Proportion of Amerindian groups in total population in each state. Source: Redatam- Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s 
national statistics offices 
 
Population Density Total population of each state divided by its total state’s surface area (sq. km). Source: Redatam- Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) and  country’s 
national statistics offices 
 
Latitude  Absolute latitude of the centroid of each state. Source: Own calculation using Geographical Information System (GIS)  
Altitude  Average altitude of each state (km). Source:  Bruhn and Gallegos (2012) and Global Gazetteer Version 2.1 
Temperature Average temperature in degree Celsius in each state during period 1950-2000. Source: Gennaioli et al. (2013) 
Land Suitability Index Average land quality for agriculture in each state. Variable takes values between 0 and 1, with higher values denoting more fertile land. Data drawn from Ramankutty et al. 
(2002), who developed a geospatial index of land suitability for agriculture by examining three major components: croplands, climate conditions and soil characteristics. The 
index represents the probability that a particular grid cell will be cultivated.  Ramankutty et al. (2002) report such index at a 0.5 degree resolution. We compute this index by 
spatially averaging all the grid cells that fall within each state. Data computed with ArcGIS 10.1.  
 
Malaria Stability Index Average values of malaria index. Variable takes values from 0 to 5, with higher values denoting more prevalence of the various types of malaria. Data drawn from Kiszewski 
et al  (2004). To calculate this index we averaged all the grid cells that fall within each state. Data computed with ArcGIS 10.1. 
 
CONTINUED… 
 
Variable  
 
Description  
  
Malaria Stability Index Average values of malaria index. Variable takes values from 0 to 5, with higher values denoting more prevalence of the various types of malaria. Data drawn from Kiszewski 
et al  (2004). To calculate this index we averaged all the grid cells that fall within each state. Data computed with ArcGIS 10.1. 
 
Ruggedness Index This index measures small-scale terrain irregularities by taking the differences of elevation of a grid cell with respect to the grid cells that surrounds it. The index is computed 
by averaging all the grid cells that fall within each state. Lower values denote areas at nearly level terrain whereas higher values represent highly rugged areas.  Data 
computed with ArcGIS 10.1. Source: Nunn and Puga (2010) available at http://diegopuga.org/data/rugged/  
  
Land Area Total surface area of each state in sq. km. Source: Country’s national statistics offices 
Land Locked A dummy variable that indicates whether states have access to the sea.  Source: Own calculation  
Distance to Capital Distance between the centroid of each state and the capital city of the country. Source: Own calculation 
Inverse Distance to Coast Distance between the centroid of each state and the nearest coastline in thousands of kilometres. Source: Gennaioli et al. (2013) 
Oil & Gas  Dummy variable that indicates the existence of oil or gas fields in each state. Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
Gold & Silver Dummy variable that indicates the existence of gold or silver mines in each state. Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
Other Mines  Dummy variable that indicates the existence of any other mines (cooper, zinc, coal, etc.) in each state.  Source: U.S. Geological Survey 
Gathering   Percentage of the population dedicated to the collection of wild plants and small land fauna. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v1. 
 
Hunting Percentage of population dedicated to hunting. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v2.  
 
Fishing  Percentage of population dedicated to fishing. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v3.  
 
Agriculture  Percentage of population dedicated to agriculture. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v5. 
 
Settlement Pattern An ordered variable that takes a value between 1-8, where 1 indicates fully nomadic and migratory societies; 2 is assigned to societies with semi-nomadic characteristics; 3 
identifies societies with semi-sedentary characteristics; 4 indicates societies that lived in compact an impermanent settlements; 5 is given to societies those in neighbourhoods 
of dispersed family homes; 6 corresponds to groups in separated hamlets forming a single community; 7 is given to societies living in compact and relatively permanent 
settlements; and 8 corresponds to groups residing in complex settlements. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v30. 
     
Class Stratification  An ordered variable that takes a value between 1-5, where 1 is given to “absence of significant class distinction among freemen, ignoring variations in individual repute 
achieved through skill, valor, piety, or wisdom”; 2 corresponds to “wealth distinctions, based on the possession or distribution of property, present and socially important but 
not crystallized into distinct and hereditary social classes”; 3 is assigned to “elite stratification, in which an elite class derives its superior status from, and perpetuates it 
through, control over scarce resources, particularly land, and is thereby differentiated from a propertyless proletariat or serf class”; 4 indicates “dual stratification into a 
hereditary aristocracy and a lower class of ordinary commoners of freemen, where traditionally ascribed noble status  is at least as decisive as control over scarce 
resources”; and 5 is given to “complex stratification into social classes correlated in large measure with extensive differentiation of occupational statuses”. Source: Murdock 
(1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v67. 
 
Slavery  A binary index that takes a value of 1 for societies characterized  by any  type of slavery and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v70. 
 
Elections  A binary index that takes a value of 1 for societies where succession was conducted through “election or other formal consensus”, and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock 
(1967), Ethnographic Atlas, v72. 
 
Inheritance Rules for Property   A binary index that takes a value of 1 for societies reporting any type of inheritance rule of real property (land), and zero otherwise. Source: Murdock (1967), Ethnographic 
Atlas, v74. 
Table A3 
Matrix of correlations 
 Pre-
Colonial 
Institutions 
Share of 
Amerindia
n pop. 
Infant 
Mortality 
Rates 
Years of 
Education 
Primary 
Education 
Secondary 
Education 
Drinking 
Water 
Electricity GDP per 
capita 
Poverty 
Rates 
Pre-Colonial Institutions 1          
           
Share of Amerindian pop. .35 1         
           
Infant Mortality Rates .02 .36 1        
           
Years of Education .05 -.34 -0.75 1       
           
Primary Education .15 -.33 -0.47 0.66 1      
           
Secondary Education .27 -.17 -0.57 0.65 0.64 1     
           
Drinking Water -.19 -.53 -0.41 0.41 0.33 0.24 1    
           
Electricity -.16 -.55 -0.59 0.60 0.59 0.59 0.64 1   
           
GDP per capita -.10 -.33 -0.54 0.51 0.44 0.56 0.40 0.59 1  
           
Poverty Rates .19 .39 0.21 -0.05 -0.23 -0.12 -0.44 -0.39 -0.52 1 
 
 
  
 Table A4 
Baseline regressions without controlling for the share of Amerindians in the population 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Cluster standard errors at country level are in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
         
Dependent variable Infant 
Mortality 
Years of 
Schooling 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Drinking 
water 
Electricity Log GDP per 
capita 
Poverty rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0282 0.0188 0.00490 0.0427*** 0.0177 0.0144 0.143 -0.0620* 
 [0.0215] [0.0170] [0.00506] [0.0125] [0.0150] [0.0105] [0.0829] [0.0302] 
         
Controls included:         
         
Share of Amerindian pop. NO NO NO NO NO NO NO NO 
Log population density  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls for geography, location 
and natural resources  
YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country fixed effects  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
         
Observations 317 316 317 317 317 317 297 270 
Adjusted R-squared 0.766 0.786 0.841 0.761 0.390 0.467 0.617 0.834 
Table A5  
Regressions where controls are added separately to the baseline regression 
         
Dependent variable Infant 
Mortality 
Years of 
Schooling 
Primary 
education 
Secondary 
education 
Drinking water Electricity Log GDP per 
capita 
Poverty rates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
         
Panel A: Baseline + Colonial activities         
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0643*** 0.0394** 0.0162** 0.0642*** 0.0489** 0.0563** 0.190** -0.117** 
 
[0.0209] [0.0140] [0.00608] [0.0170] [0.0212] [0.0228] [0.0802] [0.0436] 
         
Panel B: Baseline + pre-colonial 
population density 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0624** 0.0383** 0.0156** 0.0646*** 0.0469** 0.0536** 0.199** -0.122** 
 
[0.0215] [0.0150] [0.00609] [0.0181] [0.0201] [0.0218] [0.0792] [0.0415] 
         
Panel C: Baseline + pre-colonial 
economic activities 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0710*** 0.0757*** 0.0308** 0.100*** 0.0551** 0.0847*** 0.214** -0.147*** 
 
[0.0212] [0.0215] [0.0113] [0.0222] [0.0256] [0.0277] [0.0856] [0.0475] 
 
        
Panel D: Baseline + pre-colonial 
Settlement pattern 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0677*** 0.0556** 0.0256** 0.0831*** 0.0448** 0.0847** 0.195** -0.128*** 
 
 
[0.0220] [0.0196] [0.0103] [0.0204] [0.0172] [0.0307] [0.0839] [0.0358] 
Panel E: Baseline + pre-colonial Class 
Stratification 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0974** 0.0782** 0.0354** 0.0808** 0.0847*** 0.0944** 0.178* -0.119** 
 
[0.0397] [0.0324] [0.0135] [0.0305] [0.0266] [0.0331] [0.0849] [0.0508] 
         
Panel F: Baseline + pre-colonial 
slavery 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0630*** 0.0505** 0.0243** 0.0779*** 0.0558** 0.0798*** 0.188** -0.115*** 
 
[0.0210] [0.0174] [0.00961] [0.0200] [0.0198] [0.0248] [0.0840] [0.0379] 
         
Panel G: Baseline + pre-colonial 
elections 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0682*** 0.0521** 0.0247** 0.0780*** 0.0548*** 0.0850** 0.191** -0.114*** 
 
[0.0208] [0.0188] [0.0102] [0.0202] [0.0176] [0.0307] [0.0815] [0.0371] 
         
Panel H: Baseline + pre-colonial 
property rights 
        
Pre-Colonial Institutions -0.0620*** 0.0514** 0.0259** 0.0787*** 0.0581** 0.0784*** 0.193** -0.110** 
 
[0.0203] [0.0198] [0.0109] [0.0220] [0.0201] [0.0249] [0.0837] [0.0371] 
Note: All regressions include baseline controls (share of Amerindians, current population density, geography, location and natural resources) plus country fixed effects.  
 
 
 
 
Table A6 
Regressions for Mexican states, early and mid-20th century 
Dependent variable: Literacy rates in 1921 Literacy rates in 1930 Literacy rates in 1950 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pre-colonial institutions 0.161 0.155 0.0515 -0.0300 0.0456 0.0648 
 [0.0975] [0.111] [0.0345] [0.0373] [0.0644] [0.0913] 
 
      
Share of Amerindians -1.184 -2.021* -0.0358 -0.488 -1.237* -1.494 
 [0.984] [1.042] [0.348] [0.350] [0.673] [0.993] 
 
      
Population density -0.0185 -0.0175 0.0217 0.0306 0.0382 0.0256 
 [0.0757] [0.0619] [0.0268] [0.0208] [0.0319] [0.0414] 
       
Controls for geography yes yes yes yes yes yes 
       
Controls for location and 
natural resources 
no yes no yes no yes 
       
Observations 28 28 28 28 32 32 
R2 0.409 0.669 0.118 0.554 0.621 0.501 
       
Notes: pre-colonial institutions, share of Amerindians and population density are calculated using data from 1930 for the regressions explaining literacy rates in 1921 and 1930, and using data 
from 1950 for the regressions explaining literacy rates in 1950. Controls for geography are latitude, altitude, temperature, ruggedness, and malaria index. Controls for location and natural 
resources are land area, landlocked dummy, distance to capital, distance to coast, land suitability index, oil & gas dummy, gold & silver dummy, and other mines dummy. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
 
